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CASE NOTES
ENTERTAINMENT LAW-AN INJUNCTION RE-
STRICTING AN ACTOR'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IS AGAINST PUBLIC
POLICY-KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 164
Cal. Rptr. 571 (1980).
KGB, Inc., a San Diego radio station, first hired Ted Gi-
annoulas in 1974 to make public appearances as the station's
mascot, the "KGB Chicken".' The station sent Giannoulas to
San Diego Padres' baseball games where he was so popular
that he soon became a fixture in the stadium. His comic rou-
tine not only attracted more fans to the games, but also raised
KGB's local media standings from fifth to first place."
In 1979, at a Padres' game played away from San Diego,
Giannoulas appeared in the KGB Chicken suit without wear-
ing the chicken vest displaying the KGB call letters. The sta-
tion sued him, alleging breach of employment contract, unfair
competition, servicemark infringement, and several other
causes of action. They sought damages and an injunction
preventing Giannoulas from appearing in a chicken suit.8 The
trial court dismissed all counts except that for breach of con-
tract. However, it granted KGB a preliminary injunction on
the grounds that "likelihood of confusion" might occur in the
public mind should Giannoulas appear as a chicken.4
The first paragraph of the preliminary injunction re-
stricted Giannoulas from appearing anywhere in the KGB
Chicken costume. Paragraph 1, section (c) also prevented him
from appearing anywhere in a chicken costume which was
© by Karla C. Downs
1. The KGB Chicken is described in the preliminary injunction as "a chicken
red in color, with brown face, yellow beak, yellow webbed feet, blue eyelids, blue vest
with the letters 'KGB', and a red comb on the top of his head." KGB, Inc. v. Gian-
noulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 847 n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 576 n.2 (1980).
2. Kopper, Ted Giannoulas, 1980 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE
YEAR 78, reprinted in 104 Cal. App. 3d at 858 n.4, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 584 n.4.
3. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 846-47, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
4. Id.
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substantially similar in design to the KGB Chicken suit. The
last two paragraphs enjoined him from wearing any chicken
ensemble or suit whatsoever in (a) San Diego County and ad-
jacent counties, or (b) any sports or public event where a San
Diego County team appeared.
The California Court of Appeals' found that the prelimi-
nary injunction invalidly restricted Giannoulas' "vital right"
to earn a living and to express himself as an artist. Such an
injunction, noted the court, was against public policy. Accord-
ingly, the court granted a writ of supersedeas staying the pre-
liminary injunction except for those sections which specifically
referred to the KGB Chicken suit.
Considering first the public policy argument against re-
straints of trade, the court observed that restraining injunc-
tions have always been reluctantly issued by the courts.7 Fur-
ther, this public policy is reflected in California Business and
Professions Code section 16600 which makes many injunctions
in restraint of trade illegal.8 Relying on several recent cases,'
the court concluded that "[t]his statute presents an absolute
bar to post-employment restraints and represents a strong
public policy of this state."10 Even if employee performance
might be enjoined after breach of contract," an injunction
5. Id. at 847 & n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576 & n.2.
6. Pending appeal, the court first stayed the last two paragraphs of the prelimi-
nary injunction on January 23, 1980. KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 101 Cal. App. 3d 323,
325, 161 Cal. Rptr. 583, 584-85 (1980). After hearing the merits of the appeal, the
court also stayed subsection (c) of the first paragraph on April 21, 1980. 104 Cal. App.
3d at 847, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576. The second opinion elaborates on the reasoning of
the earlier opinion, and, indeed, incorporates substantial portions verbatim.
7. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77 (citing Arthur Murray
Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1952); 11 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS §§ 1423, 1450 (3d ed. 1968); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 380, comment
g (1932)).
8. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 577. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
16600 (Deering 1976) states: "Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind is to that extent void." The exceptions do not apply here, see CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02 (Deering 1976).
9. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d 147, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 107 (1965); Golden State Linen Serv., Inc. v. Vidalin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137
Cal. Rptr. 807 (1977); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 35, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, aff'd, 414 U.S. 117 (1972).
10. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 577. See Briody, Employment
Agreements Not to Compete in California, 47 CAL. ST. B. J. 318 (1972).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (Deering 1972) provides in part that an injunction
cannot be issued
[tjo prevent the breach of a contract, other than a contract in writing for
the rendition or furnishing of personal services from one to another
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should issue only for the term of the contract, not beyond the
term. 12
Even in states where injunctions in restraint of trade are
not illegal, the court emphasized that in order for them to
stand, the party seeking them must carry the heavy burden of
showing that enforcement is reasonable.' s The circumstance
most relevant to reasonableness is "irreparable harm to the
employer.""' KGB claimed that the "likelihood of confusion"
in the public mind which would result from Giannoulas'
chicken appearances would irreparably harm the station.
However, the court found that this claim was ridiculous in
light of the free publicity which KGB had received "no doubt
to its delight" from Giannoulas' nationally famous chicken ap-
pearances.'3 Further, KGB did not produce evidence of actual
injury sufficient to plead a good cause of action. As the court
stated, "where are the lost listeners? Likelihood of confusion
is insufficient; the confusion must be hurtful to the employer
where the minimum compensation for such service is at the rate of not
less than six thousand dollars per annum and where the promised ser-
vice is of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary or intellectual charac-
ter, which gives it peculiar value the loss of which cannot be reasonably
or adequately compensated in damages in an action at law, the perform-
ance of which would not be specifically enforced.
A question has arisen as to whether the last clause of this section applies only to
contracts other than unique service contracts, or whether it applies to all service con-
tracts. While courts do not specifically enforce personal service contracts, they may
interpret this clause to allow enforcement of covenants not to compete. See Briody,
supra note 10, at 353-54; Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts
in the Entertainment Industry, 42 CALIF. L. Rxv. 18 (1954); Youngman, Negotiation
of Personal Service Contracts, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 2 (1954). But see CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 526 (Deering 1972), which sets off the unique service contract language in
parentheses, implying that courts could specifically enforce these special contracts.
California courts have specifically enforced these contracts, but only for the contract
term. See note 12 infra.
12. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 849-50, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (citing Loew's, Inc. v. Cole,
185 F.2d 641, 657 (9th Cir. 1950) (dictum); MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90
Cal. App. 3d 18, 24, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 (1979); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 671, 679, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1969)).
13. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 577. Restraints on trade that have
been held valid in California include: those limiting competition by the seller of a
business, Roberts v. Pfefer, 13 Cal. App. 3d 93, 91 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1970); those barring
one party from pursuing a limited part of a business, Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil
Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 188, 41 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1964); those forbidding use of former
employer's customer lists or trade secrets, Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 321 P.2d
456 (1958).
14. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (referring to Arthur Murray
Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1952)).
15. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 858 n.4, 859, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84 n.4, 584.
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before an injunction is justified."16 In deciding that "likeli-
hood of confusion" was insufficient to show irreparable harm,
the KGB court followed Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc.
v. Witter, where the court determined that the employer must
prove his injury is actual, not probable.1 7
Based on the public policy that he who expends labor to
create a valuable product should reap the benefits of its use,18
the court also rejected KGB's unfair competition claim. Ac-
cording to the court, Giannoulas had not misappropriated
KGB's labor because Giannoulas' contribution was of "inevi-
table significance" in developing the "fluid, changing, clown-
ish role."19 Further, the court found that Giannoulas had not
deceived or misled the public, since he was not implying in his
chicken routines that he represented KGB.20 Giannoulas' per-
formances met neither the misappropriation nor the deception
element necessary for KGB to sustain a claim in unfair com-
petition. The court also pointed out that an injunction re-
straining the pursuit of one's livelihood would be an inappro-
16. Id. at 850, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
17. First there must be injury, either actual or threatening. It must be
real, not imaginary and not doubtful. There can be no irreparable injury
without injury. There can be no adjective modifying a noun if there is
no noun. Second, conceding that an irreparable injury is something diffi-
cult to measure, usually there must be something more than just fear of
injury, and something more than trivial or inconsequential injury.
105 N.E.2d at 702.
The Arthur Murray court distinguished the situation where a negative covenant
not to compete in a contract for selling a business is held violated on a presumption
of injury, from the case where such a covenant in an employee contract will be held
violated only with proof of injury. The KGB court quotes Arthur Murray extensively
on how this distinction arises:
The average, individual employee has little but his labor to sell or to use
to make a living. He is often in urgent need of selling it and in no posi-
tion to object to boiler plate restrictive covenants. . . .To him, the
right to work and support his family is the most important right he pos-
sesses. . . .He is more likely than the seller to make a rash, improvi-
dent promise that, for the sake of present gain, may tend to impair his
power to earn a living, impoverish him, render him a public charge or
deprive the community of his skill and training. . . .A seller is usually
paid an increased price for agreeing to a period of abstention. . . .Usu-
ally the employee gets no increased compensation.
Id. at 704, quoted in 104 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
18. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 221 (1918).
19. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (citing 248 U.S. at 221). The
court did not deny that KGB had some rights to the KGB Chicken, but it found that
those rights were limited to the fixed design of the chicken suit. Accordingly, the
court allowed those sections of the preliminary injunction which prevented Giannou-
las from wearing the KGB Chicken outfit to stand.
20. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 850, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
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priate remedy in an unfair competition case."
The court used a third public policy argument based on
strict construction of contracts to deal with KGB's breach of
contract claim.22 These contracts referred specifically to the
costume and concept of the KGB Chicken and generally to
any ideas, characters, programs, themes, titles, and subject
matter by Giannoulas during his employment.2 3 A negative
covenant not to compete also restrained Giannoulas from be-
ing a mascot for another radio station in the San Diego mar-
ket for five years after employment with KGB.2 4 After exam-
ining 'these contracts, the court strictly construed their
language against the employer and decided that the contracts
gave KGB exclusive rights only to the KGB Chicken, not a
monopoly over all of Giannoulas' appearances in any chicken
suit.25
The court also rejected KGB's contention that the station
had rights to the KGB Chicken role merely because it had
assisted in the development of the role. As the court observed,
no precedent has been found which clearly defines "the re-
spective rights in fictional characters of the artist who plays
the role, the employer who finances and assists him, and
members of the general public who choose to imitate aspects
of the character."2 The court proceeded to establish that Gi-
annoulas had both rights of publicity and first amendment
rights in the character which he had developed.
To support its conclusion, the court focused on two cases:
Lugosi v. Universal Picturess and Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Productions.29 The decision in Lugosi followed a
21. Id. at 851, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
22. The court noted that this claim should only be considered where a restraint
of trade is not banned by statute. Id. at 852, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Not all restraints
may be banned in California. See notes 11-13 supra.
23. Id. at 852-53, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
24. Id. at 852, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
25. Id. at 853, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 580 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hargadine, 392
F.2d 9, 20 (6th Cir. 1968); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 236(0, 515 (1932)).
26. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 853, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
27. Id. at 854, 859-60, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 581, 585.
28. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). Lugosi had por-
trayed "Dracula" in a Universal Pictures film. His heirs sued Universal Pictures for
its profits in licensing to commercial firms the use of the likeness of the character.
The California Supreme Court held that the actor's right of publicity was personal
and must be exercised by him during his lifetime, if at all. After his death, his name
and likeness entered the public domain. Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
328. But see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
29. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). The nephew of the
1981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
modern trend in national court decisions that an actor has a
right of publicity in the role he has created.30 While the KGB
court distinguished the issues in Lugosi as not determinative
of KGB's rights,"1 they agreed that an actor has "rights to de-
cide how and when to exploit his identity and to enjoy the
fruits of his labor."' s2
More importantly the KGB court gave Giannoulas first
amendment rights in the fictitious character he had devel-
oped. First amendment rights for entertainment have been
discussed by some courts in recent years, but not in reference
to an actor's rights in a role created for an employer.88 Chief
Justice Bird in her concurring opinion in Guglielmi explicitly
stated that entertainment "is entitled to the same constitu-
tional protection as the exposition of ideas."" The KGB court
adopted the Chief Justice's distinction between "the commer-
cial right to earn a living [and the] personal freedom of artis-
tic expression."8 5 According to the court, both of these are vi-
tal rights" and an
employer has a weak case against his employee when he
seeks to prevent future performances, unless he can point
to a specific contract conferring such rights. His naked
claim of having assisted the development of the role is not
enough; presumably he has been compensated for the as-
sistance by the revenues from performances while the em-
ployee still worked for him. 7
In view of section 16600 and KGB's inadequate factual
deceased actor Rudolph Valentino sued the television producers of a fictionalized ver-
sion of the actor's life. As in Lugosi, the court held that the right of publicity was not
descendible and expired upon death. Id. at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
353.
30. 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326. See note 60 infra.
31. The parties involved in Lugosi were not former employer and employee, but
past employer and employee's heirs. The issue was the inheritability of the right of
publicity.
32. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 854, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
33. See note 62 infra.
34. 25 Cal. 3d at 867, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (concurring opinion)
(citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977); Bris-
coe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 535, 483 P.2d 34, 38, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870
(1971); Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242, 411 P.2d 289, 294, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537,
542 (1966); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 253 P.2d 441, 444
(1953)).
35. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 854, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 581. See 25 Cal. 3d at 869-74, 603
P.2d at 459-62, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 356-61 (concurring opinion).
36. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
37. Id. at 853, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
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showing of irreparable harm and express contract, the court
refused to enforce the preliminary injunction which prohib-
ited Giannoulas from exercising his rights of publicity and ar-
tistic expression. 8
The court recognized two limits to an artist's rights in the
role he developed. First, the role must be exclusively associ-
ated with the actor; the actor's identity with that role must be
impressed in the public mind. 9 The court rejected KGB's
claim to exclusive identity with the comic chicken routine by
examining the case of West v. Lind,' wherein Mae West lost
her claim to exclusive association with a role she had played.
The court found that KGB had a claim to exclusive associa-
tion with the KGB Chicken only, and not with the remainder
of Giannoulas' chicken roles.41
The second limit imposed by the court requires that the
actor's style be a "unique individual likeness. '42 The court ex-
tended this concept beyond facial expressions to the general
body language and behavior of masked or unmasked actors.48
Whether a high consideration was paid to the actor was also
considered as evidence of uniqueness.4
KGB also failed in its attempt to invoke Labor Code sec-
tion 2860, which provides that everything acquired by an em-
ployee "by virtue of his employment" belongs to his em-
ployer.'5 This statute has previously been applied to protect
an employer from employee misappropriation of trade secrets
and confidential information. 46 The court refused to extend its
use to protect an employer's rights in an actor's creations dur-
ing employment when no express contract provided the em-
38. Id. at 859-60, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
39. Id. at 854-55, 164 -Cal. Rptr. at 581.
40. 186 Cal. App. 2d 563, 9 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1960). Mae West was unable to
enjoin defendant's appearance as "Diamond Lil," a role West claimed to have devel-
oped, because the role was not exclusively associated with West in the public mind.
41. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
42. Id., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); 42
CALiF. L. REv., supra note 12, at 21.
43. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
44. Id., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
45. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (Deering 1973) states: "Everything which an em-
ployee acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to
him from his employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or unlaw-
fully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment."
46. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 582. See, e.g., California Intelli-
gence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948); Riess v.
Sanford, 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941).
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ployer with such rights. 7
KGB asserted two other claims that were dismissed by
the court. KGB argued that by continuing to perform, Gian-
noulas was infringing on their registered servicemark, the
KGB Chicken. The court concluded that chicken costumes in
general could not be subject to monopoly, since the strong
public policy in trademark and servicemark law is "to prevent
monopoly of generic names or of functional or utilitarian as-
pects of products."4' Further, the court found that a person
wearing a chicken costume could not be a servicemark because
a servicemark must be stationary and unchanging; the ser-
vicemark must identify the source of a service, not the service
itself.' The concept of a person performing in a chicken cos-
tume appeared to the court to be in the public domain.50 KGB
could not remove by claim of monopoly that which had en-
tered the public domain.51
Finally, KGB claimed that the court was without jurisdic-
tion to contradict the trial court's factual findings. The court
agreed with this contention, and accepted the trial court's
finding that a costumed chicken at a public event had a secon-
dary meaning in the public mind. Nonetheless this was "insuf-
ficient to show irreparable harm, or indeed any harm, and it
does not warrant a preliminary injunction restricting constitu-
tionally protected freedoms and possibly violating a statute as
well."52 Furthermore, the court found the injunction was inva-
lid because it was not based on a valid complaint,s it did not
preserve the status quo," and it was so vague, uncertain, and
broad that, if supported, it would be difficult to enforce and
47. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
48. Id. at 856, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (citing Application of Deister Concentrator
Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (1961)).
49. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Cebu Ass'n v. Santo Nino de Cebu, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 129, 136-
37 (1979); Polish Nat'l Catholic Church of the Holy Mother of the Rosary v. Diocese
of Buffalo, 171 N.Y.S. 401 (1918).
52. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 858, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
53. The servicemark and unfair competition charges had been dismissed before
the injunction issued. Id. at 859, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (citing Moreno Mut. Irrigation
Co. v. Beaumont Irrigation Dist., 94 Cal. App. 2d 766, 778, 211 P.2d 928, 935 (1949);
Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mut. Water Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 709, 719, 137 P.2d 757,
762 (1943)).
54. Giannoulas no longer worked for KGB and the status quo was never that
Giannoulas could not wear any chicken suit. 104 Cal. App. at 859, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
585. See Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 528, 439 P.2d 889, 899, 67
Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 (1968).
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might invite continual litigation."
The significance of KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas is best un-
derstood through an examination of prior case law. Courts in
the United States have always struggled in dealing with en-
croachments on artistic expression, especially when transient
human performances are involved."6 An actor, such as Charlie
Chaplin, who portrays a character which he originally created,
may have protected rights in that character. 7 If rights in a
character are expressly contracted for and restraints of trade
are not banned by statute, courts will enforce such cove-
nants." But the actor has often been denied the rights to a
character which he performed with the aid of an employer
and without an express contract guarantee. Both the right of
privacy and unfair competition have proved inadequate bases
to support the actor's claim to his character.5' The modern
concept of the right to exploit one's own identity for commer-
cial benefit, which has been called the right of publicity, was
fashioned to treat the actor's rights more fairly.6e
Recently, a trend has developed in national court deci-
sions to consider an actor's performance as artistic expression.
This allows the actor to claim first amendment rights to per-
form; mere entertainment is'unprotected. e ' Of the cases which
55. 104 Cal. App. at 859, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 585 (citing Pitchess v. Super. Ct., 2
Cal. App. 3d 644, 651, 83 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 (1969); People v. Gordon, 105 Cal. App. 2d
711, 725, 234 P.2d 287, 296 (1951)).
56. Gaskin, The First Amendment: Blanket Protection for Performance Arts?
15 PUBLISHING ENTERTAINMENT ADVERTISING & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 411 (1976).
57. Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928). Charlie Chaplin
sued to enjoin the defendant from imitating the character "Charlie Chaplin" without
authorization. An injunction was granted on the grounds that Chaplin had originated
and played the character himself. Id. at 362-63, 269 P. at 545-46.
58. See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952); Lillie v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 139 Cal. App. 724, 34 P.2d 835 (1934); Kirby, An Artist's Personal
Rights in His Creative Works: Beyond the Human Cannonball and the Flying Cir-
cus, 17 PUBLISHING ENTERTAINMENT ADVERTISING & ALLIED L.Q. 159, 170 (1978).
59. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941) (right of
privacy inadequate to prevent use of football player's photograph in calendar); Para-
mount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939) (unfair competi-
tion did not protect plaintiff where defendant did not pass off items as his own). See
Nimmer, Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
60. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Et-
tore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1956); Haelan
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953); Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4
Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
61. "It is highly questionable whether performance arts could be excluded from
first amendment protection simply because of their dual function of expression and
entertainment. But the suppression of performance arts is rooted in such a dichot-
1981]
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have discussed first amendment protection for entertainers,
none confer these rights on the actor who creates a role under
his employer.62 The KGB court found that an actor enjoyed a
right of publicity and a first amendment right in his unique
role. The injunction, however, was modified based on the pub-
lic policies against suppressing freedom of expression, pirating
another's labor, and restraining trade, thereby skirting the is-
sue of whether performance is specifically protected under the
first amendment.
Thus, two major questions were left unanswered by the
court's opinion. The first involves distinguishing between pro-
tected artistic expressions and unprotected entertainment.
The second question concerns the relationship between con-
tract rights and the rights to earn a living and to artistic
expression.
The vague guidelines set by the court to determine what
constitutes artistic expression create the first problem. The
court does not consider what distinguishes an artistic per-
formance from entertainment. Can it be assumed that all per-
formances are artistic, and therefore are protectable under the
first amendment?63 The extent to which the actor must de-
velop a role before he can be said to contribute significantly to
it also remains uncertain and the concepts of "unique individ-
ual likeness" and public identification need more clarification.
The second question, concerning the competing interests
of contract rights and the right to earn a living and to artistic
expression, stems from the reluctance of the court to decide
whether the covenant in restraint of trade under consideration
in KGB would be illegal in California. Although the court sug-
gested at the start of the opinion that it would discuss this
omy." Gaskin, supra note 56, at 411.
62. The Court extended first amendment rights to motion pictures in 1952. Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). An initiative adopted by the electo-
rate to ban home subscription television was declared unconstitutional because first
amendment rights protected this means of dissemination for both entertainment and
the exposition of ideas. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr.
537 (1966). Theatrical street performances in protest of the draft were placed under
first amendment protection in Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970). These
rights were not a defense to copying the fictional characters of another. Sid & Marty
Kroft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972). A television station
did not have first amendment rights to show plaintiff's complete act on their news
program. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
63. See Gaskin, supra note 56, at 412.
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issue, it failed to do so.' Instead, the court stated that such
covenants would possibly be invalid, but did not decide what
this possibility would be." However, if covenants not to com-
pete were enforced by injunction," the court could find that
the actor's first amendment rights and his right to earn a liv-
ing preempt the employer's contract rights in California.
Karla C. Downs
64. "We deal with a conflict between an employer's asserted contract rights and
the fundamental rights of an employee to earn a living, even in possible violation of
the employer's bargain with him." 104 Cal. App. 2d at 846, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
65. Id. at 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The court probably left this issue to be
decided on the merits of the breach of contract case because of the factual determina-
tions involved and the uncertain interpretation of section 3423, supra note 11.
66. Such a determination might be made under section 3423, supra note 11.
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EXCLUSIONARY RULE-FEDERAL COURT SUPERVI-
SORY POWER CANNOT BE USED TO SUPPRESS EVI-
DENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED FROM THIRD
PARTY-United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
The use of the exclusionary rule outside of the fifth
amendment area' was expanded in a long line of Supreme
Court decisions to the benefit of the criminal defendant. In
Weeks v. United States' the Court required federal courts to
exclude evidence seized in violation of a defendant's fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The scope of the rule was further expanded to in-
clude evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
guarantees of due process3 and the assistance of counsel. In
McNabb v. Mallory,' the federal exclusionary rule was in-
voked on still other grounds-as an exercise of the Court's
"supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts".' Finally, the Warren Court ex-
tended the Weeks rationale and imposed the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule on state courts in Mapp v. Ohio7 by
overruling Wolf v. Colorado.6
Since the accession of the Burger Court, however, there
has been a gradual contraction of the potential scope of the
rule which had enabled the government's collateral use of ille-
gally obtained evidence in civil,9 grand jury, 0 and habeas
corpus" proceedings. On a par with these apparent limita-
tions of the Mapp decision must be placed the Burger Court's
decision in Rakas v. Illinois," which firmly established the
0 1981 by Devin Derham-Burk.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 634-35 (1886).
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1962).
4. United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964).
5. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
6. Id. at 34i.
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
9. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1975).
10. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
11. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
12. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
rule that a defendant vicariously asserting the fourth amend-
ment rights of a. third party does not have "standing" 8 to
avail himself of the protections of the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule. In a decision characteristic of the Burger
Court's disenchantment with the rule, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Payner,1 4 left ajar another courtroom door
for the admission of evidence obtained by official lawlessness
by imposing the same standing requirements onto the exercise
of the supervisory powers of federal courts. The majority con-
cluded that a federal court's supervisory powers do not au-
thorize it to suppress evidence illegally obtained from third
parties not before the court.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service initiated an investi-
gation into the financial affairs of American citizens in the Ba-
hamas. The project, "Operation Trade Winds," was headquar-
tered in Jacksonville, Florida and supervised by special agent
Richard Jaffe.
In 1972, after learning that an alleged narcotics trafficker
had an account at the Castle Bank and Trust Company of the
Bahamas, agent Jaffe asked private investigator Norman Cas-
per to further investigate Castle Bank and its depositors. As
part of his plan to obtain the requested information, Casper
arranged with Jaffe's approval, a date between a female em-
ployee, Sybol Kennedy, and Michael Wolstencroft, who was
Vice-President and Trust Officer of Castle Bank. While the
couple was on the date, Casper seized Wolstencroft's briefcase
from Kennedy's apartment and brought it to a prearranged
residence where the four hundred documents inside the brief-
case were photographed by Jaffe, Casper, and an IRS photog-
raphy expert. Casper replaced the briefcase when a lookout
informed him the couple was returning to the apartment.
Ultimately, the documents photographed by the IRS un-
covered a loan guarantee agreement in which Payner pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a
$100,000 loan. An IRS investigation of Payner's 1972 federal
income tax return led to his indictment on a charge of falsify-
ing his 1972 federal income tax return in violation of 18
13. Justice Rehnquist phrases the issue in terms of whether the defendant har-
bored a legitimate expectation of privacy as opposed to whether the defendant has
standing to claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
14. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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U.S.C. section 1001.15
In federal district court, Payner sought to have the docu-
ments found in Wolstencroft's briefcase excluded from evi-
dence since they were obtained through an illegal and uncon-
stitutional seizure of Wolstencroft's briefcase. Contending
that the documents were admissible, the Government relied
on three arguments. First, the Government contended that
Payner had no standing under the fourth amendment to al-
lege that the seizure of the briefcase was unconstitutional.
Secondly, the Government maintained that the seizure was
not so outrageous as to require exclusion under the due pro-
cess guarantee of the fifth amendment. Finally, the Govern-
ment argued that the court should not invoke its supervisory
power over federal criminal prosecutions to exclude the
evidence.
The district court agreed with the Government's first con-
tention"6 but ruled that the incriminating evidence should be
excluded because the Government's seizure was purposefully
conducted in contravention of the Constitution and Florida
law and was so outrageous as to infringe on Payner's due pro-
cess rights. The district court also concluded that the factual
circumstances of the case warranted the invocation of its su-
pervisory power over federal prosecutions to exclude the dam-
aging evidence.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per
curiam opinion affirmed the district court's suppression of the
evidence as a proper exercise of the district court's supervi-
sory powers. As a result, the court of appeals did not reach
the due process question.
The United States Supreme Court granted the Govern-
ment's petition for certiorari and reversed the district court's
decision in an opinion written by Justice Powell. While the
opinion addressed the fourth amendment, fifth amendment,
and supervisory power theories, any of which could justify the
exclusion of relevant evidence, the thrust of the opinion fo-
cused on the supervisory power theory.
The Court dealt with the fourth amendment issue briefly
15. In pertinent part § 1001 provides: "Whoever, in any matter within the juris-
diction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully
falsifies .... a material fact or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements
.. . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
16. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 126 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
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by reiterating its position in Rakas that fourth amendment
rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously as-
serted.17 Thus, the Court agreed with the reasoning of the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals, that since Payner did not
possess a privacy interest in the documents seized from Wol-
stencroft's briefcase, he lacked standing under the fourth
amendment to suppress the documents.1 8
In introducing its discussion of the supervisory power is-
sue, the Court articulated its reticence in applying the exclu-
sionary rule. While the Court first made it clear that courts
should not condone unlawful evidence gathering schemes, it
pointed out that illegally obtained evidence should not be ex-
cluded in every case." A court's desire to deter or denounce
such schemes must be balanced against the "considerable
harm" which results from the suppression of relevant evi-
dence-the impairment of a court's ability to ascertain the
truth.20 According to the Court, prior cases have "consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanctions to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury.''92
The Court acknowledged the use of supervisory powers in
prior decisions to "exclude evidence taken from the defendant
by 'willful disobedience of law,'" but noted that these author-
ities were not controlling where the illegally obtained evidence
was seized from third parties.2 2 Rather, the Court was guided
by other decisions which indicated that a federal court's su-
pervisory power is "applied with some caution even when the
defendant asserts a violation of his own rights."'28 Given this
distinction between evidence obtained from third parties not
before the court and evidence obtained from a defendant, the
majority then proceeded to "engraft the standing limitations
of the Fourth Amendment onto the exercise of supervisory
powers."2
In the majority's view,. the analysis involved the same
17. 447 U.S. 727, 731.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 734.
20. Id.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id. 735 n.7 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)).
23. Id. at 734-35 (citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754-57 (1979);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960)).
24. Id. at 748 (dissenting opinion).
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question as to whether the exclusion was examined under the
supervisory power or the fourth amendment 2 5 Under either
theory the same "competing interests" are brought into play:
society's interest in "presenting probative evidence to the trier
of fact" 6 and the court's interest in "deterring illegalities and
protecting judicial integrity. 2 7 Within this framework, the
Court found the societal interest controlling. The Court con-
cluded that a federal court may not use its supervisory power
to suppress evidence illegally obtained from third parties not
before the court. The rationale for that conclusion was that
prior "Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond
any doubt that the interest in deterring illegal searches does
not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of
a party who was not the victim of the challenged practices. 2 8
In a terse dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the holding
for effectively allowing the government to turn the standing
requirements of the fourth amendment "into a sword to be
used by the Government to permit it deliberately to invade
one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evi-
dence against another person. ' 29 The dissent criticized the
majority's failure to address "several key findings" made by
the district court, which apparently demonstrated that the
dual purposes of the exclusionary rule would have been ad-
vanced by its application in the instant case. One particularly
disturbing district court finding was that the government
agents "'plotted, schemed, and ultimately acted in contraven-
tion of the United States Constitution and the laws of Florida,
knowing that their conduct was illegal' ,0 thus demonstrating
their "'bad faith hostility toward the strictures imposed on
their activities by the Constitution.' " The dissent was even
more troubled, however, by the district court's finding that
the Government "'affirmatively counsels'" its agents that the
fourth amendment standing requirements allow them to ille-
gally seize evidence from one individual so that it may be used
against third parties who are the "'real targets'" of the gov-
25. Id. at 736.
26. Id. at 736 n.8.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 735.
29. Id. at 738.
30. Id. at 742 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 130 (N.D.
Ohio 1977) (footnote omitted)).
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 130 (N.D. Ohio
1977) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)).
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ernmental investigation. 2 Justice Marshall acridly pointed
out that the majority did not deal with or disturb these
findings.
Additionally, the dissent emphasized that supervisory
powers have been used in the past to protect the integrity of
the federal courts by "prevent[ing] the federal courts from be-
coming accomplices to [governmental] misconduct."" a In clos-
ing, the dissent argued that the Court's decision rendered the
supervisory powers "superfluous" since to successfully exclude
evidence on the basis of supervisory powers, criminal defen-
dants must also establish a violation of their fourth or fifth
amendment rights. 4
The Court's seeming indifference to the outrageousness of
the Government's conduct was perhaps best demonstrated by
the summary manner in which it treated the fifth amendment
argument; the majority addressed the issue in a footnote.3 5 Af-
ter noting that the court of appeals "expressly declined to
-consider the Due Process Clause,"" the Court added that
even if the illegal seizure was so outrageous as to contravene
Payner's due process rights, he would not be able to avail
himself of any due process protection unless the "'govern-
ment activity in question violated some protected right of the
defendant.' ,,37
In addition to carefully presenting the facts, the majority
was cautiously focused on the deterrence rationale 5 which is
perhaps the most impotent of all justifications advanced for
the invocation of the exclusionary rule.3 9 In view of the fact
that recent studies indicate that the exclusionary rule fails as
a device to deter illegal searches and seizures by the police,4 °
the majority's conclusion that "deterring such conduct is out-
32. Id. at 743 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 131-33 (N.D.
Ohio 1977) (footnotes omitted)).
33. Id. at 744.
34. Id. at 748.
35. Id. at 737 n.9.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1975) (plurality
opinion) (emphasis in original)).
38. Id. at 737.
39. Traditionally, there were three rationales offered for the exclusionary rule:
1) protection of privacy interests, 2) protection of the integrity of the federal courts,
and 3) deterrence of illegal conduct by government officials. McMillian, Is There
Anything Left of the Fourth Amendment?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 7 (1979).
40. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. OF CHI.
L. REV. 665, 755-56 (1970).
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weighed by the societal interest in presenting probative evi-
dence" '41 seemed inevitable.
By focusing on the deterrence rather than the integrity
rationale, the court directly avoided the supervisory power is-
sue. As the dissent noted, supervisory powers were exercised
in the past for the expressed purpose of preserving judicial
integrity. 42 Instead of adequately addressing this argument,
48
however, the majority responded by imposing fourth amend-
ment standing requirements onto the exercise of the supervi-
sory powers. Now, in order for evidence to be suppressed
under the exercise of the federal court's supervisory powers,
the defendant's own fourth amendment privacy rights must
be violated-if they are not, the evidence will come in regard-
less of the criminality of the underlying conduct.
United States v. Payner clearly confirms an existing
trend by the Burger Court to limit the effect of the exclusion-
ary rule. While holding that a third party's own privacy rights
must be violated before he or she may invoke the supervisory
powers to exclude illegally obtained evidence is unambiguous,
the Court leaves important questions unanswered. What a
third party defendant must now assert in order to get relief
when his or her own privacy rights have been violated is un-
clear. In spite of its claim to the contrary, it is also questiona-
ble whether the Court means to condone illegal seizures so
long as the evidence will be used against a third party who
was not the direct victim of the seizure. Finally, the Court
equivocates on the question of whether a third party defen-
dant must satisfy fourth amendment standing requirements in
order to suppress illegally obtained evidence under the fifth
amendment.
Though Chief Justice Burger has urged that the exclu-
41. 447 U.S. at 736 n.8.
42. Id. at 744.
43. In a footnote, the majority responded to the dissent's argument that an ex-
ercise of supervisory powers deals primarily with the need to protect the integrity of
the federal courts. While the majority acknowledged that the protection of judicial
integrity was one of the "two-fold" purposes of supervisory powers, it dispensed with
the supportive cases cited by the dissent by concentrating on the fact that the defen-
dants in those cases were "themselves the victims of the challenged practice". Id. at
736 n.8. In the majority's view, the crucial factor in those cases which warranted the
exclusion of evidence was that the defendants satisfied the fourth amendment stand-
ing requirements. The majority did not interpret the dissent's cited cases to stand for
the proposition that evidence obtained through governmental misconduct should be
excluded regardless of the defendant's standing in order to preserve judicial integrity.
Id.
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sionary rule should be abolished altogether, except in a minor-
ity of cases," Payner indicates that the Burger Court is not
yet ready to abolish the exclusionary rule. However, the Court
remains content to tortuously avoid the rule's sanction.
Devin Derham-Burk
44. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-STEPPARENT IS LIABLE
FOR SUPPORT OF SPOUSE'S CHILDREN FROM PRIOR
MARRIAGE BUT TAX RETURNS ARE NOT DISCOVER-
ABLE IN DETERMINING" EXTENT OF LIABILITY-In
Re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1979)
The order dissolving the marriage of Gary and Roberta
Brown granted custody of their three children to Gary. After
her remarriage, Roberta filed a petition to regain legal custody
of the three children. Gary resisted Roberta's petition and
further sought an order to compel her to pay child support.
He obtained a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum ordering
the deposition of Roberta's present husband Paul, and the
production of certain income tax returns filed during the mar-
riage of Roberta and Paul. Asserting a spousal privilege, Paul
refused to testify or to produce the tax returns. Gary sought
to have sanctions imposed upon the ground that Civil Code
section 2501 prevented the marital privilege claim in child
support proceedings. Paul responded with a motion to quash
the subpoenas. The Superior Court of Sacramento County
granted Paul's motion to quash.2
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision,
holding that all property of the former wife, including her
community property interest in the income of her new hus-
band pursuant to California Civil Code section 5127.5,8 can be
looked to in discharge of her statutory child support obliga-
tion. The court reached this result despite California Civil
Code section 199 which provides that in the event of a disso-
lution of marriage "the obligation of a father and mother to
support their natural child. . . shall extend only to, and may
0 1981 by Susan Atchison
1. Section 250 provides: "Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of
communications between husband and wife are inapplicable under this title. Hus-
band and wife are competent witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including
marriage and parentage." CAL. CIV. CODE § 250 (West Supp. 1980).
2. In re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 704-705, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524,
525 (1979).
3. CAL. Cxv. CODE § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1980) provides that the wife has man-
agement and control of her interest in community property to the extent necessary to
support her children. This includes her community property interest in the earnings
of her new husband. The Code also provides that the natural father is not thereby
relieved of any legal obligation to support his children.
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be satisfied only from, the earnings and separate property of
each . . . .
The court in Brown reasoned that section 199 is confined
by its own terms to "child support proceedings brought under
this chapter," and further noted that the stated chapter is
not the only legislation imposing an obligation of child sup-
port." To bolster its position, the court pointed to the legisla-
tive history of the two sections. The Senate Bill from which
section 199 emerged 7 originally included a repeal of section
5127.5 but the repealing language was stricken, "thus negat-
ing any legislative intent to repeal section 5127.5 and any con-
clusion by the Legislature that the two statutes were
conflicting."
The court further held that Paul was properly allowed to
assert a statutory spousal privilege against disclosure of both
federal and state tax returns and Roberta's former husband
was not entitled to depose Paul regarding those returns.9 The
court concluded that the privilege protecting information con-
tained in income tax returns 0 bars the discovery of tax
4. CAL. CIv. CODE § 199 (West Supp. 1980).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 199 states in pertinent part: "The obligation of a father and
mother to support their natural child under this chapter . . . shall extend only to,
and may be satisfied only from, the earnings and separate property of each, if there
has been a dissolution of their marriage .... " (Emphasis added.)
6. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1980) which provides that a
court may order either or both parents to pay any amount necessary for the support,
maintenance, and education of the child.
7. Section 199 emerged from Cal. Sen. Bill No. 569 (1973-74 Reg. Seas.) § 23;
Cal. Sen. Amend. to Cal. Sen. Bill No. 569 (1973-74 Reg. Sess.) May 23, 1973, § 21;
Cal. Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 569 (1973-74 Reg. Sess.) June 11, 1973, § 21.
8. 99 Cal. App. 3d at 707, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
9. The Brown court did not rest its holding solely on the spousal privilege of
Civil Code section 250. The court indicated that:
although we are of the view that Civil Code Section 250 does not grant
Gary the right to depose Paul as a witness in the proceeding against
Roberta, the issue requires no extended discussion. The record shows
that the purpose of the deposition was to question Paul in obvious con-
junction with the production of his income tax returns. What we have
said in the disposition of that issue is equally applicable here, if it does
not in fact moot the issue concerning his privilege not to testify or to be
called as a witness against his wife.
99 Cal. App. 3d at 710, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 527-528.
10. The judicially created privilege against the discovery of income tax returns
from a construction of Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19282 (West Supp. 1980), which
makes it a misdemeanor for the Franchise Tax Board or any other officer or employee
of the state, including its political subdivisions, to disclose or make known in any
manner information as to the amount of income or any particulars set forth or dis-
closed therein. Say-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 1, 123 Cal. Rptr. 283
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records in this instance and that the exception to this rule,
recognized in the context of the enforcement of child support
obligations," is inapplicable.
The court's decision attempts to define the extent of a
stepparent's duty to support the children of his or her spouse
by a former marriage while limiting the availability of discov-
ery for this purpose. Under careful scrutiny, however, the
court's holding is not decisive since it is vulnerable to future
attack as a result of its reliance on Civil Code Section 5127.5.
Furthermore, the court's definition of a stepparent's privilege
in income tax records affords ample opportunity for future
manipulation in subsequent proceedings.
It is well established that parents have a legal duty to
support their minor children. 12 The obligation imposed by va-
rious statutes s constitutes a codification of the duty which
existed at common law.' 4 The general rule in California speci-
fies that "[iln any proceeding where there is at issue the sup-
port of a minor child, the court may order either or both par-
ents to pay any amount necessary for the support,
maintenance, and education of the child."' 5 There is a strong
legislative interest in assuring that minor children receive ade-
quate support" and this policy is consistently reflected in case
law.17 Nevertheless, when the parents of a child separate, and
(1975); Webb v. Standard Oil, 49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957).
11. The exception to the rule regarding the privileged nature of income tax re-
turns is a result of the decision in Miller v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 3d 145, 139
Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977), which held that the privilege does not apply in the context of
enforcement of child support orders made pursuant to the Family Law Act.
12. Trial courts have the power to require either the father or mother or both to
assist in the support of minor children. Moore v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d 698, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1969); Nunes v. Nunes, 62 Cal. 2d 33, 41 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1964); see also
Lyons v. Municipal Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 829, 844, 142 Cal. Rptr. 449, 456 (1977),
where the trial court imposed criminal penalties for willful failure of parents to sup-
port their minor children.
13. CAL. CIv. CODE § 196 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv. CODE § 206 (West Supp.
1979); CAL. CIv. CODE § 242 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4700 (West Supp.
1980); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4811 (West Supp. 1980)(duty of support and maintenance of
minor children).
14. In Re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 520, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 79 (1970).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1980).
16. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4701(f)(West Supp. 1980), provides that "[NJothing in this
section shall limit the authority of the district attorney to utilize any and all civil and
criminal remedies to enforce child support obligations regardless of whether or not
the custodial parent receives welfare moneys." See also, CAL. PENAL 'CODE § 270
(West Supp. 1980), which imposes an obligation of support on both parents.
17. There is a statutory obligation of child support imposed on parents which
continues notwithstanding the parent's lack of custody. The extent of the parental
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one or both of the former spouses remarry, the law has been
neither clear nor consistent in delegating the responsibility
for child support."8
Under prior statutory and case law it was lawful for a
stepparent to refuse any financial responsibility for his or her
stepchild."' Trial courts were nevertheless given broad discre-
tion to determine responsibility in each case,20 guided only by
the "urgency of the needs of the child and relative hardship to
each parent in contributing to such needs."2 This flexible
standard resulted in a number of cases explicitly recognizing
that, while a divorced mother's remarriage is not in itself a
sufficient ground for redefining child support obligations, it is
a factor which may be considered.22
With the enactment of Civil Code section 5127.5 in 1971,
a new statutory duty was imposed on the formerly unaccount-
able stepparent. This statute provides that the wife's interest
in the community property of her new marriage, including the
support is left to the sound discretion of the court. Lyons v. Municipal Court, 75 Cal.
App. 3d 829, 142 Cal. Rptr. 449; Moore v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d 698, 79 Cal. Rptr.
293; Nunes v. Nunes, 62 Cal. 2d at 39, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 9. See also In re Marriage of
Muldrow, 61 Cal. App. 3d 327, 132 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1976).
18. See Burns v. Burns, 190 Cal. App. 2d 714, 12 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1961) which
noted the conflict among California cases regarding the effect of a wife's remarriage
on the father's duty to support his children, some cases indicating that remarriage
may be considered and others holding that it has no effect. Burns held that the wife's
remarriage did not necessarily require modification of an allowance for child support.
Evans v. Evans, 185 Cal. App. 2d 566, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1960), held that the remar-
riage of a divorced wife had no effect upon the continuing duty of the father to pro-
vide for the support and maintenance of their children. But see Mattos v. Correia,
274 Cal. App. 2d 413, 79 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1969) and Cagwin v. Cagwin, 112 Cal. App.
2d 14, 245 P.2d 379 (1952) which considered the mother's remarriage when determin-
ing the father's duty to support their children.
19. "Generally speaking, the second husband is not bound in the absence of
special extraordinary circumstances to maintain his wife's children by a former hus-
band from whom she has been divorced." Chapin v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. App. 2d
851, 857, 49 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (1966). CAL. CIv. CODE § 209 (West Supp. 1979)(re-
pealed 1979 Cal. Stats. Ch. 1170) provided that an individual was not bound to main-
tain a spouse's children by a former relationship.
20. See Moore v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 702, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 295; Levy v.
Levy, 245 Cal. App. 2d 341, 359, 53 Cal. Rptr. 790, 802 (1966); Woolams v. Woolams,
115 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 251 P.2d 392, 395 (1952).
21. Levy v. Levy, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 359, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 802; Moore v.
Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 702, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 295; Mattos v. Correia, 274 Cal. App.
2d at 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
22. Burns v. Burns, 190 Cal. App. 2d 714, 12 Cal. Rptr. 68. See also, e.g., Evans
v. Evans, 185 Cal. App. 2d 566, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412 (remarriage of divorced wife has no
effect upon the continuing duty of the husband to provide support); Cagwin v.
Cagwin, 112 Cal. App. 2d 14, 245 P.2d 379 (mother's remarriage may be considered
when determining father's obligation to support children).
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earnings of her new husband, is liable for the support of her
children. The earlier "No Duty" statute, California Civil Code
section 209,"8 which held a stepparent unaccountable, stood in
conflict with section 5127.5 until 1979. In that year, the "No
Duty" statute was repealed and replaced by California Civil
Code section 5127.6 which provides that "the interest of a
natural or adoptive parent in the income of his or her spouse
shall be considered unconditionally available for the care and
support of any child residing with the child's natural or adop-
tive parent who is married to such spouse."' The 1979 legisla-
tion leaves no doubt regarding the duty imposed upon a step-
parent to provide for any child who resides with the
stepparent.
In Brown, however, the 1979 provisions could not be ap-
plied because the children were not living with Roberta and
her new husband Paul. Thus, the court relied on section
5127.5 to find Paul liable, and it is that reliance which gives
rise to concern regarding the validity of the court's ruling.
This concern involves the court's required reconciliation of
section 5127.5 with California Civil Code section 199 which
limits the child support liability of divorced parents to their
earnings, the assets acquired from those earnings, and the
separate property of each.
Moreover, section 5127.5 was enacted before the major re-
vision of California's community property laws. This section
gives the wife control of her community property interest to
the extent necessary to support her children; however, it was
enacted when the husband controlled community property
and was not amended to reflect the new laws giving equal
management and control to the wife. Thus, it may be inferred
that the statute was intended to deal with a situation existing
only when the husliand had control of community property
and that the wife's acquisition of equal management rights re-
pealed the section by implication.2 5
If the statute succumbs to these stated objections," sec-
23. The "Nd Duty" statute, CAL. CIv. CODE § 209 (West 1979), provided that a
stepparent is not obligated to support the children of his or her spouse's former
relationships.
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (West Supp. 1980).
25. See generally 2 CAL. FAM. L. PRAC. & PROC. § 2319 (2); see also CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980), which gives the right of equal management and con-
trol of community property to the wife.
26. The court's reliance on section 5127.5 also involves the possible unconstitu-
tionality of a statute which refers exclusively to the support of a woman's children
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tion 199, which was rejected in Brown, remains the only alter-
native legislation applicable in cases where the child does not
live with the stepparent who is to be charged with a support
obligation. It must be noted, however, that section 199 has
been declared unconstitutional by the Attorney General 7 on
the ground that it discriminates against the children of mar-
ried parents28 and may thus not answer the liability question.
It has been proposed that, because of the severe objec-
tions to section 5127.5, and the probable unconstitutionality
of section 199, future courts may be required to apply general
community property principles to determine the liability of a
stepparent in a case such as Brown. 9 Under community prop-
erty principles, all community property except the earnings of
the non-debtor spouse will be liable for the pre-marital debts,
and all community property, including the earnings of the
non-debtor spouse, will be liable for post-marital debts. 0
There are no cases construing child support as either a pre-
marital or a post-marital debt and a persuasive argument may
be made for either position. 1
Concluding that a stepfather's earnings may be subject to
the support of his wife's children by a former marriage, the
Brown court then considered whether the new husband's in-
come tax returns may be subpoenaed in order to determine
the extent of that liability.
The California Supreme Court in Say-On Drugs, Inc. v.
Superior Court"' established the general rule of privilege in
discovery of tax returns. The court indicated, however, that
there might be circumstances under which discovery of tax re-
while making no provision for a man's children. If the section is struck down on equal
protection grounds, the decision in Brown has no foundtion and thus, no validity.
27. 59 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 15 (1976).
28. See 2 CAL. FAM. L. PRAC. & PROC. § 23.19 (2) which notes that § 199 had
been held to be unconstitutional by the Attorney General who found that the chil-
dren of married parents and unmarried parents are treated differently under the sec-
tion. He found that it discriminated against the children of married parents who can-
not obtain support from the community earnings of their parent's second spouse,
while the children of parents who have never married are not governed by the section
and therefore can obtain support from such community earnings.
29. Id.
30. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5120 and 5116 (West Supp. 1980).
31. It might be argued that child support is an obligation which arose before
marriage and is therefore premarital. As the duty of support is a continuing one,
however, a persuasive argument can also be made in support of the position that it is
a post-marital debt, at least as to payments which are to be made after the marriage.
2 CAL. FAM. L. PRAC. & PROC. § 23.19 (2).
32. 15 Cal. 3d 1, 123 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1975).
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turns would be permissible, 83 thus laying the foundation for
exceptions to the judicially created privilege. The courts pres-
ently recognize a single exception to this rule, created in
Miller v. Superior Court.," In Miller the court determined
that in child support cases, public policy favors disclosure of
tax records. Clearly, the Miller court had a legislative enact-
ment, Revenue and Taxation Code section 19286.5,35 leading
it to this conclusion. 6 This section allows the Director of So-
cial Services to inspect the income tax records of the responsi-
ble relative(s) of any applicant or recipient of social services
in order to verify eligibility. Miller concluded that the same
policy considerations apply to child support enforcement pro-
ceedings between private parties "in order that the children
who stand to benefit thereby may not become public
charges. '3 7 Brown found this limitation to be of importance,
but refused to extend its application to the case where there is
not yet an existing order for child support. The court con-
cluded that the difference is "more than one of form, in the
context of policy to be followed."3 Since the court does not
explain these policy distinctions, some difficulty may exist in
accepting its failure to apply the considerations articulated in
Miller. The difficulty becomes especially acute when a child
depends entirely upon the stepparent for support.Brown further indicated that the public interest in pre-
serving the marital relationship "as enunciated in the spousal
privilege" does bar disclosure of the present husband's tax re-
turns.3 9 The court placed great emphasis on the fact that the
Miller's marriage had terminated while that of Roberta and
Paul is intact. This distinction between proceedings involving
divorced spouses as opposed to proceedings involving a mar-
33. Id. at 8, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
34. 71 Cal. App. 3d 145, 149, 139 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1977).
35. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19286.5 (West Supp. Pamphlet 1980).
36. Although Brown specifically states that § 19286.5 is not applicable to the
case, the section is relevant insofar as it lays the foundation for the Miller decision
which Brown has relied upon. This section provides that the Director of Social Ser-
vices may inspect income tax records belonging to applicants or recipients of assis-
tance and their responsible relatives in order to verify or determine the eligibility or
entitlement of an applicant. (Emphasis added). See also In re Marriage of Sammut,
103 Cal. App. 3d 557, 562, 163 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1980), which states that "[iut is
clear that the Miller court had a legislative enactment directing its path to a conclu-
sion that in child support cases public policy favors disclosure of income tax records."
37. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 149, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
38. 99 Cal. App. 3d at 709, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
39. Id.
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riage still intact was recently found "unpersuasive," however,
"as the same result can occur in a Miller type case. ' 0
The stronger argument for the Brown decision is in its
recognition of the fundamental difference between an existing
duty to support a child and the mere apportioning of such
duty. It is obviously important to assure that a child receive
the support he or she needs and in most instances the impact
upon the child's welfare is immediate. The same concerns are
not always relevant where the liability is merely to be appor-
tioned. It is left to the courts to determine the applicability of
"judicially created" rules.41 Brown reflects a sound balancing
of these considerations by determining that the privileged na-
ture of tax information outweighs the interest in apportioning
support obligations when the child's welfare is not immedi-
ately at issue. Yet, as the Brown decision is based primarily
upon a balancing of policy considerations, each subsequent
decision will require a new balancing in light of new facts. To
that extent, application of the stated rule may be difficult.
In conclusion, the court's holding-that all the property
of the mother, including her community interest in the in-
come of her new spouse, may be looked to in discharge of her
child support obligation, but that the tax records of her new
spouse are not discoverable-is not as determinative as it first
appears. A more conclusive answer would entail a direct legis-
lative determination regarding the rights of a minor child in
the community property and earnings of a parent and step-
parent with whom the child does not reside, and it is left to
future decisions to define the full ambit of the tax privilege in
the context of child support proceedings.
Susan Atchison
40. In re Marriage of Sammut, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 562, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
41. Wilson v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 63 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829,
134 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1976).
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DAMAGES-A JURY SHOULD RECEIVE EVIDENCE
AND INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE IMPACT OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ON AN AWARD OF
DAMAGES-Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, 444
U.S. 490 (1980).
In most cases1 that arose under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act (FELA) 2 prior to Norfolk and Western Railway
Co. v. Liepelt,8 trial judges refused to instruct the jury con-
cerning the impact of federal income taxes on the amount of
damages to be awarded. The United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue for the first time in Norfolk ,because, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, "the prevailing practice developed
at a time when federal taxes were relatively insignificant, and
because some courts are now following a different practice.""
In Norfolk, the decedent, a freight train fireman, was
killed when a locomotive collided with a loaded hopper car on
a siding track.5 The administrator of the decedent's estate
brought a wrongful death action under the FELA in state
court to recover damages from the railroad. After the circuit
court in Cook County, Illinois, entered judgment for the ad-
ministrator and awarded damages of $775,000,6 the railroad
appealed. The judgment was affirmed by the First District
Appellate Court of Illinois,' and a subsequent appeal to the
0 1981 by Lynette Inga
1. See Raines v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 51 Ill. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125
N.E.2d 77 (1955).
2. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).
3. 444 U.S. 490 (1980), rehearing denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
4. Id. at 491.
5. The trial court held that the railroad was negligent, and the negligence issue
was not brought before the Court. Id. at 491 n.2.
6. Id. at 491.
7. 62 Ill. App. 3d 653, 378 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
8. The court held that it was "not error to refuse to instruct a jury as to the
nontaxability of an award" and that it was "not error to exclude evidence of the effect
of income taxes on future earnings of the decedent." 62 I1. App. 3d 653, 668-69, 378
N.E.2d 1232, 1245 (1978).
The Appellate Court of Illinois recognized that the practice then being followed
in Illinois could be subject to change when the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue. However, since the United States Supreme Court was silent on the
issue, the Appellate Court of Illinois decided to follow the decisions of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Raines v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 51111. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972), and in Hall v. Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., 5
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Illinois Supreme Court was denied.9 The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, and held that (1) evidence of
the income taxes payable on the decedent's past and esti-
mated future earnings was admissible, and (2) the trial court
should have instructed the jury that the damages awarded
would not be subject to income taxation.0
The administrator's (the respondent's) economic expert
had estimated that the net pecuniary loss to the decedent's
family would amount to $302,000.11 The expert arrived at this
figure by first estimating that the decedent's earnings would
have increased approximately five percent per year, which
would amount to $51,600 in the year 2000, the year of the de-
cedent's expected retirement."2 The expert then added the
gross amount of those earnings to the value of the services the
decedent would have performed for his family, and subtracted
the amount the decedent would have spent upon himself.'3
The total sum amounted to $302,000, when discounted to pre-
sent value at the time of trial.'
4
Petitioner railroad objected to the use of gross earnings,
without any deduction for income taxes. Through its own ex-
pert, petitioner offered to prove that the decedent's federal
income taxes from 1973 to the year 2000 would have
amounted to $57,000.'1 Taking that figure into account, and
making different assumptions about the rate of future in-
creases in salary and the calculation of the present value of
Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
In Raines, the Illinois Supreme Court held that in an action under the FELA it
was immaterial that the award to the plaintiff would not be subject to income tax and
that it was not error to refuse to instruct the jury as to the taxability of the award.
The court cited Hall:
Whether the plaintiff has to pay a tax on the award is a matter that
concerns only the plaintiff and the government. The tortfeasor has no
interest in such question. And if the jury were to mitigate the damages
of the plaintiff by reason of the income tax exemption accorded him,
then the very Congressional intent of the income tax law to give an in-
jured party a tax benefit would be nullified.
Id. at 151-52, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
9. 444 U.S. at 491 n.3.
10. Id. at 491.
11. Id. at 492. The measure of damages in a wrongful death action under the
FELA is the loss of the pecuniary benefits which the decedent's family would have
received. Id. at 493.





1981] NORFOLK R.R. v. LIEPELT
future earnings, the expert estimated $138,327 as the net pe-
cuniary loss. 10 The jury, however, returned a verdict of
$775,000.17
Both petitioner and respondent offered arguments to ex-
plain the jury's award of a larger sum than either side had
calculated. Petitioner argued that the jury must have believed
that the award was subject to federal income taxation, and
that the petitioner was prejudiced by the trial judge's refusal
to instruct the jury that the award would not be subject to
income taxation. 8 Respondent argued that the jury must have
considered the pecuniary value of the guidance the decedent
would have provided to his children. 9
The two issues addressed by the Court were (1) whether
the jury should be instructed as to the taxability of the dam-
ages awarded, and (2) whether evidence of the impact of in-
come taxation on future earnings should be admissible. Jus-
tice Stevens asserted that the two issues were governed by
federal law2" since the measure of damages in a FELA action
is federal in character, even if the action is brought in state
court."1
Addressing the issue of whether evidence of income taxa-
tion should be admitted, respondent offered a "Pandora's
Box" argument: if this door is opened, other equally relevant
evidence must also be admitted. Respondent claimed that "in
discounting the estimate of future earnings to its present
value, the tax on the income to be earned by the damages




19. Id. at 492 n.4.
20. Id. at 492-93.
21. Id. at 493.
22. Id. at 495. "[T]he product of plaintiff's lost earning power ex-tax and
his expectancy will have been discounted to produce 'that sum of money
which if invested at a fair rate of return will yield annually the amount
by which the plaintiff's earning capacity has been lessened and which
will at time of end of the plaintiff's life expectancy be reduced to zero.
This takes into account the fact that money earns interest each year;
and it should be remembered that this interest is taxable. Therefore, if
a court is going to use income after taxes as a measure of plaintiff's loss,
it must add back the taxes which would be due on the interest
earned-else the award would not fully compensate for the loss.'"
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960), citing Morris and Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recov-
eries and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A. J. 274, 328 (1960). See also Nord-
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present value, like future earnings, should probably be esti-
mated on an after-tax basis.23 However, the Court was not
persuaded that merely because such an after-tax estimate
would also be admissible, gross earnings should be used in-
stead of net earnings to determine the pecuniary loss to the
decedent's family.2'
Expanding on the "Pandora's Box" argument, respondent
argued that her attorney's fees and litigation costs were an
equally relevant factor in determining compensation.2 5 The
Court rejected this argument by claiming it was contrary to
the "American Rule."'2 6 In addition, the Court explained that
unlike a number of other federal statutes, the FELA does
not allow recovery of attorney's fees. The Court firmly dis-
posed of the argument by asserting that a relevant factor,
such as income tax, should not be ignored "in order to offset
what may be perceived as an undesirable or unfair rule re-
garding attorney's fees."28
The Court held that evidence of the amount of income
tax payable on past and estimated future earnings should not
be excluded. First, the Court noted that "[iln a wrongful-
death action under the FELA, the measure of recovery is 'the
damages . . . [that] flow from the deprivation of the pecuni-
ary benefits which the beneficiaries might have reasonably re-
ceived .... I ,29 The Court asserted that income tax is a rele-
vant factor in determining pecuniary loss because net income
is the only realistic measure of the decedent's ability to sup-
port his family. 0
Second, the Court rejected the argument that evidence of
income taxation on future earnings is too speculative and
complex for jury deliberation.31 Justice Stevens stated that
strom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 212, 227-28
(1958). (Emphasis in original).
23. 444 U.S. at 495.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 495. The traditional "American Rule," according to BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979), is that attorney's fees are not awardable to the winning
party unless statutorily or contractually authorized.
27. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5)(k)(1976); Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
28. 444 U.S. at 495-96.
29. Id. at 493 (citing Michigan Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70
(1913)).
30. 444 U.S. at 493.
31. Id. at 494. "This is not to say, however, that introduction of such evidence
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because juries are increasingly familiar with modern life com-
plexities, the evidence will be understood if presented simply
and effectively."2
The Court also held that it was error for the trial judge to
refuse to instruct the jury that the damages awarded would
not be subject to income taxation. 3 Justice Stevens asserted
that the jury may not realize that wrongful death awards are
not subject to taxation. Furthermore, " 'giving the instruction
can do no harm, and it can certainly help by preventing thejury from inflating the award and thus overcompensating the
plaintiff on the basis of an erroneous assumption that the
judgment will be taxable.' "" The Court stated that the in-
struction could be made brief, comprehensible, and nonpreju-
dicial to either party. Thus, it would not complicate the trial,
but merely eliminate speculation by the jury. Explaining that
the award is nontaxable, and that no additions or subtractions
should be made for income tax purposes, should aid the jury
in awarding damages.5
Norfolk marks a new approach by the United States Su-
preme Court. By previously remaining silent on the issue, the
Court appeared to condone the practices of the lower courts.
The Court has now asserted that the jury should receive evi-
dence and instructions on the impact of federal income taxa-
tion on an award of damages.
Although the Court avoided the issue of whether the rul-
ing would result in a windfall to the tortfeasor, it did not
avoid the issue of whether Congress intended to confer a tax
benefit on the plaintiffs' through section 104(a)(2) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.87 The dissent claimed that Congress in-
must be permitted in every case. If the impact of future income tax in calculating the
award would be de minimis, introduction of the evidence may cause more confusion
than it is worth." Id. at 494-95 n.7.
32. Id. at 494.
33. Id. at 498.
34. Id. (citing Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
35. Comment, Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ig-
nored?, 7 ARIZ. L. REv. 272, 279 (1966).
36. 444 U.S. at 496 n.10.
37. The section provides in relevant part:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) de-
ductions allowed under Section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses)
for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agree-
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tended section 104(a)(2) to confer a benefit on the victim or
his survivors, and that the Court's ruling tends to appropriate
that benefit- to the tortfeasor. 5
The majority, on the other hand, did not believe that
Congress intended section 104(a)(2) to benefit the survivors.
The Court found nothing in the language or legislative history
of section 104(a)(2) to suggest that the section has an impact
on the measure of damages in a wrongful death action. The
Court stated that "netting out the taxes that the decedent
would have paid does not confer a benefit on the tortfeasor
any more than netting out the decedent's personal
expenditures."'
The Court seems to strain in this portion of the decision.
Both deductions achieve the same result, a lower award. But
it is unrealistic to assume that making deductions, which in
turn lower the damages awarded, would not benefit the
tortfeasor, who would then pay less money.
Overall, the decision is a good one. As the Court points
out, giving the jury the instruction will do no harm. The in-
struction may help prevent large awards, which may result
from a misconception regarding taxation. Large awards in-
crease insurance costs as well as other costs and the public
eventually bears the burden of these increased costs.
Using future net earnings is more accurate than using fu-
ture gross earnings to arrive at a figure which closely repre-
sents the plaintiff's loss. The decedent would have had to pay
income taxes on his earnings if he had been alive. The legal
system's goal is to compensate the plaintiff for his losses, not
to overcompensate him.
Norfolk could have a tremendous impact on jury instruc-
tions. Older cases illustrate that not much intelligence was at-
tributed to members of the jury.'0 However, jurors are becom-
ing more intelligent, as larger numbers of persons finish high
school, and attend college and graduate school.' 1 As courts
ment) on account of personal injuries or sickness;
"The section is construed to apply to wrongful-death awards; they are not taxable
income to the recipient." Id. at 496.
38. Id. at 498-99 (dissenting opinion).
39. Id. at 496 n.10.
40. Income taxes have not been taken into consideration in past cases primarily
because it was believed the jury would be confused. Id. at 494.
41. The total enrollmeift of persons in institutions of higher education increased
from 5.9 million in 1965 to 11.2 million in 1975 and is expected to be 13.4 million in
1985. Statistics of Higher Education 1977-78 Y. B. OF HIGHER EDUCATION 584
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recognize that jurors are attaining a greater degree of sophisti-
cation, jury instructions will become more complex. More
complex instructions will give the jury the opportunity to
weigh the issues in a superior light, and perform its judicial
duties more efficiently. There is no valid reason why a jury
should be left to speculate. An informed jury is a better jury.42
Norfolk cannot help but clarify any questions the jurors
may have concerning federal income taxation. Using net in-
come figures instead of gross income figures results in an
award that is fair to both parties. The defendant would be
prejudiced if the jury awarded a larger sum to the plaintiff
because the jury mistakenly believed that the plaintiff would
have to pay federal income taxes on the award. Our system ofjustice cannot permit a plaintiff to recover a larger award than
he is entitled to receive. Fairness is the basis of our legal sys-
tem, and defendants as well as plaintiffs deserve to be treated




42. Since there is no exact correspondence between money and physical or
mental injury and suffering, the various factors involved in determining the amount
of damages in personal injury or wrongful death actions are not capable of exact
proof in terms of dollars and cents; hence, the only standard is such an amount as a
reasonable person would estimate as fair compensation. Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal.
2d 820, 823, 172 P.2d 353, 354 (1946). In Norfolk, the jury may have considered fac-
tors such as the care and guidance that the decedent would have provided to his
children.
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